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At the close of his discussion of time in Book 11 of the Confessions (397–
401), Augustine abandons his empirical inquiry for an impassioned prayer.
He writes:
Behold, my life is a dispersion and a distraction. . . . I have been frag-
mented in times, the order of which I do not know; and my thoughts
and the inmost viscera of my soul are torn apart with tumultuous
change; until the day when I shall flow together into You, purified and
made molten by the fire of your love (Conf. 11.29).1
As this passage suggests, Augustine’s attitude toward time is pro-
foundly ambivalent. On the one hand, time scatters and distracts the soul
intending toward eternity, so that it loses sight of true Being and turns
away from God. Working in the Neoplatonic tradition, Augustine associates
time with all that is not, in the fullest sense of the word: with imperma-
nence, mutability, materiality, and even, by a certain slippage, with sin.2
An earlier version of this essay was read at the Annual Meeting of the Medieval
Academy of America, Toronto, 1997.
For reading and commenting on versions of this essay, I am grateful to David
Austin, Robert Hanning, H. Marshall Leicester, Edith Sylla, and the members of the
Columbia University medieval seminar.
1. “Ecce distentio est vita mea. . . . At ego in tempora dissilui, quorum ordinem
nescio, et tumultuosis varietatibus dilaniantur cogitationes meae, intima viscera ani-
mae meae, donec in te confluam purgatus et liquidus igne amoris tui” (St. Augustine’s
Confessions [1912; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979], 2:279–280). All
citations are to this edition; all translations are mine.
2. For differing views on time and sin in Augustine’s thought, see Henri Marrou,
L’Ambivalence du temps de l’histoire chez saint Augustin (Paris: Vrin, 1950), pp. 71–75 pas-
sim; Jaroslav Pelikan, The Mystery of Continuity: Time and History, Memory and Eternity in
the Thought of Saint Augustine (Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1986),
pp. 30–32; R. Teske, Paradoxes of Time in Saint Augustine (Milwaukee: Marquette Uni-
versity Press, 1996), pp. 28–31; and Teske, “‘Vocans Temporales, Faciens Aeternos’:
St. Augustine on Liberation from Time,” Traditio 4 (1985): 36 n.13. For neither
Plotinus nor Augustine is matter (time) a sufficient cause of evil or sin; see Lloyd Ger-
son, Plotinus (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 197–98; and John M. Rist, Augustine: An-
cient Thought Baptized (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 103–4.
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On the other hand, Augustine, as a Christian, holds that all things created
by God, including time, are good. Time, moreover, is the singular medium
of redemptive history, preeminently the Incarnation, and the condition of
the soul’s progress toward salvation. Of this progress, made possible by
the Mediator, Augustine writes: “We turn ourselves towards Him tem-
porally . . . in order to remain with Him eternally. For He Himself at a
certain moment of time was ‘the Word made flesh’” (De Trin. 7.3.4–5).3
Originally arising in his bringing together of the Neoplatonic and Judeo-
Christian traditions, Augustine’s ambivalence about time produces a con-
stant tension in his thought.4
It is in the larger theological context of this unresolved ambivalence—
which may well have inspired his repeated inquiries into temporality—that
I wish to locate Augustine’s two accounts of time.5 His first account is
psychological or interior. In the brilliant meditation of Confessions 11, Au-
gustine argues that time is to be found in the measuring mind. As he
concludes, time is a distention or extension of mind (distentio animi), a sort
of temporal “stretching” of the rational soul produced by the mental opera-
tions of remembering, attending, and anticipating. This first account is
subjective in the sense that Augustine locates time in the mind (animus) or
consciousness of the subject, whose ability to measure intervals is prior to
and independent of any observed physical motion. To take an extreme
example of this position: in his early treatise On Genesis against the Manichees
(388–389), Augustine argues that the interval “day” could have existed
before the creation of the sun, just as cave-dwellers unable to observe the
heavens can nevertheless calculate temporal intervals (1.14.20).6 The psy-
chological account of Confessions 11 is not without antecedents in ancient
3. Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna (Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University of America Press, 1963). On Christ as Mediator (1 Tim. 2.5), see De Civ.
9.15. This paper will not discuss Augustine’s account of sacred history, which—inso-
far as we can agree that history exists—seems the least problematic of his models of
time. See the classic study of R. A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology
of Saint Augustine, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
4. Most commentators agree that rigidly opposing Augustine’s Neoplatonism
and Christianity creates a false antithesis. On tension between action in the tempo-
ral world (saeculum) and contemplation, see Rist, Augustine, pp. 200–2.
5. The bibliography on Augustine’s views of time is long. These selected major
studies emphasize the place of his discussions in ancient thought and Christian
theology: John Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy, rev. ed. (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979); Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint
Augustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960); Jean Guitton,
Le temps et l’éternité chez Plotin et Saint Augustin (Paris: Vrin, 1959); Marrou, L’Ambiva-
lence; Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (London: Duckworth, 1987); A.
Solignac, “Notes Complémentaires,” in Les Confessions, vol. 14 of Oeuvres de Saint
Augustin (Paris: Brouwer, 1962); Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Rist, Augustine.
6. Saint Augustine on Genesis: Two Books on Genesis against the Manichees 1.14.20,
trans. R. Teske (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1991), p. 69.
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thought, but it is not taken up by later medieval thinkers; nor is it developed
elsewhere by Augustine himself.7
Augustine’s second account of time, which proves to be an enduring
influence throughout the Middle Ages, concerns the physical world. In
an important thread running through his many discussions of creation,
from the earliest treatises on Genesis to the City of God (413–426), Augus-
tine unambiguously associates time with matter, motion, and change. As
this account emphasizes, time began with creation and is a consequence
of it. As Augustine explains in his Literal Commentary on Genesis (401–415),
“With the motion of the creature, time began to run its course. It is idle
to look for time before creation, as if time can be found before time”
(5.5.12).8 Since in eternity there is no change, and since time depends
on motion and change, time cannot precede creation; the world was made
with time (De Civ. 11.6).9 As this argument suggests, Augustine’s account
of time in the physical world develops in the larger cosmological consid-
eration of material and spiritual creation, the “earth” and “heaven” of
Genesis 1:1. Representing a discrete strand of thought, his physical ac-
count of time will consistently emphasize material mutability and formal
change; for example, the time of the physical cosmos is characteristically
described as “the movement of the creature from one state to another”
(De Gen. 5.5.12; Conf. 12.6–8).10 Augustine will frequently  turn  to this
physical account of time both to distinguish between stable eternity and
ever-changing temporality and to deny the possibility of temporality an-
tecedent to creation.
7. O’Daly, Mind, p. 157; Sorabji, Time, p. 30. As H. Chadwick, trans., Saint
Augustine: Confessions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 230n., notes,
“Augustine’s discussion of time contains many echoes of . . . Platonists, Aristote-
lians, and Stoics.” See n.42, below.
8. “Factae itaque creaturae motibus coeperunt currere tempora: unde ante
creaturam frustra tempora requiruntur, quasi possint inveniri ante tempora tem-
pora” (De Gen. 5.5.12). La Genèse au sens littéral, ed. P. Agaësse and A. Solignac, vols.
48–49 of Oeuvres de Saint Augustin (Paris: Brouwer, 1972). My translations are
indebted to J. H. Taylor, trans., Saint Augustine: The Literal Meaning of Genesis, 2 vols.
(New York: Newman Press, 1982).
9. The view that time and the cosmos began together may be traced to the
Timaeus, which Augustine understood to mean that the world had a (temporal)
beginning (see Tim. 28b–c, 38b; Enn. 3.7.12). He writes: “[The world] had a
beginning, as Plato clearly admits, although some believe that he was not expressing
his real opinion” (City of God 12.13, trans. Henry Bettenson [New York: Penguin
Books, 1967], p. 486). Most early Platonists understood Timaeus 28b–c and 38b to
mean that the origin of the world is causal, not temporal (thus Calcidius); see F. M.
Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology (1937; New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1975), pp. 24–27; and
Sorabji, Time, pp. 268–72. On Philo as Augustine’s source for this reading of Plato,
see Sorabji, Time, p. 234. According to Pierre Courcelle, Late Latin Writers and their
Greek Sources, trans. H. E. Wedeck (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1969), pp. 168–80, Augustine read Cicero’s translation of the Timaeus and did not
make use of Calcidius.
10. “[Tempus est] creaturae motus ex alio in aliud . . . ” (De Gen. 5.5.12).
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In the considerable critical literature on Augustine and time, most
modern commentators have focused on Confessions 11, thus suggesting that
Augustine gave primacy to his subjectivist or psychological account.11 More
recent interpretation, however, urges a broader perspective. Augustine’s
views on time have been reexamined, for example, by James McEvoy, who
argues that “Augustine would wish us to accept that ‘time’ refers to at least
two different things, the one physical, the other experiential.”12 In an
influential reassessment of Augustine’s writings, Gerard O’Daly has argued
that Confessions 11 does not give a definition of time, but instead investigates
how the passage  of time is measured by the  mind.13 To these  critical
reevaluations it may be added that, while the terms “psychological” (or
“experiential”) and “physical” have a sound basis in Confessions 11–12, and
have proved important in modern discussion, for Augustine time is most
simply conceived as the modality of finite creation. As Etienne Gilson has
observed, tempus is his sole term for the world of becoming.14 In conse-
quence—as has been seen—Augustine’s account of time in the physical
world is developed in a larger cosmological context. Time depends on the
change to which all things, whether mental or physical, are subject: “For if
there were no motion of either a spiritual or corporeal creature . . . there
would be no time at all” (De Gen. 5.5.12; my emphasis).15 Taking as a starting
11. See, for example, Guitton, Le temps, Gilson, Christian Philosophy, Sorabji,
Time, and O’Daly, Mind, who discuss both views of time but take Conf. 11 to be
definitive. This focus on subjectivism may reflect the lively interest of some modern
philosophers (e.g., Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein) in Conf. 11.
12. James McEvoy, “St. Augustine’s Account of Time and Wittgenstein’s Criti-
cism,” Review of Metaphysics 38 (1984): 547–77. That time is associated with both the
physical world and the perceiving soul is similarly the view of, for example, Solignac,
“Notes,”  Hugh  Lacey, “Empiricism and  Augustine’s Problems about Time,” in
Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. R. A. Markus (Garden City, N.Y.: Dou-
bleday, 1972), pp. 280–308, and Rist, Augustine. Lacey finds an “apparent incompati-
bility” between “the subjectivist strand [which] relates to the measurement of time”
and “the objectivist strand [which relates] to time itself.” Teske, Paradoxes, tries to
reconcile the two accounts by adducing the Plotinian World Soul; Rist, Augustine, p.
83 n.75, refutes this theory.
13. O’Daly, Mind, pp. 152–54. Gerard J. P. O’Daly, “Augustine on the Measure-
ment of Time: Some Comparisons with Aristotelian and Stoic Texts,” in Neoplatonism
and Early Christian Thought, ed. R. H. Blumenthal and R. A. Markus (London:
Variorum Pub. Ltd., 1981), pp. 171–79. Similarly, Chadwick (p. 230 n.19) notes that
Conf. 11 has affinities with the skeptical view that the question, “What is time?” is
unanswerable. He adds, “At least, Augustine does not answer it.”
14. Etienne Gilson, “Notes sur l’être et le temps chez saint Augustin,” Recher-
ches Augustiniennes 2 (1962): 205–23.
15. “Motus enim si nullus esset uel spiritalis uel corporalis creaturae, quo per
praesens praeteritis futura succederent, nullum esset tempus omnino” (De Gen. ad
Litt. 5.5.12). It is thus inaccurate to associate “cosmological” time with the physical
universe alone—since it depends also on the motion of angels and human minds—
and confusing to speak of such time as “objective.”
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point the readings of McEvoy and O’Daly, I will examine the hypothesis that
Augustine’s two accounts of time—in the mind and in the physical world—
are compatible and complementary.
This hypothesis may be explored in the early treatise On Music (387–
391), where Augustine himself provides a model that appears to accommo-
date both the psychology and physics of time. On Music examines the
operations of the perceiving soul, taking as example the well-known eve-
ning hymn by Ambrose of Milan—the same “Deus creator omnium” which
in Confessions 11 illustrates the passage of time.16 In On Music, Augustine
shows perception to be a purely psychological process, an activity of soul
which conveys reliable information about the sense-world.17 In effect, his
two thought-experiments with Ambrose’s hymn appear to construct similar
models of the soul’s activity in relation to the world: whether hearing iambs
in On Music 6 or measuring their duration in Confessions 11, the soul that
acts upon sense impressions is attentive to and affected by its own opera-
tions. If these models are in fact analogous, then the mind’s measurement
of time can be viewed as an act of perception, ending in cognition. And
indeed, in Confessions 12.8—an account of the time of the physical world—
Augustine makes clear that he views time as an object of perception. As he
writes: “[T]ime can be perceived and measured [in the mutability of mat-
ter], for times [tempora] come into being [fiunt] by the alterations of things
as their forms are varied and turned.”18 Yet here, as in similar passages,
Augustine’s characteristic use of the passive voice makes it difficult to assess
the precise relations between the world and time, and time and mind. We
do not know in what sense the alteration of things can be said to make time,
where the time made by this formal change is located, or whether the time
associated  with  material  mutability  is the  same as  the  time  said to be
measured in mind (cp. Conf. 11.27).19
In turning again to Augustine’s discussions of time, therefore, I want for
the moment to put aside the distinction between psychological time and the
time of the physical world—since in themselves these categories tell us little
about the relations of mind, world, and time—and distinguish rather between
the two sorts of inquiry, ontological and epistemological, with which Au-
gustine develops his views. The famous question of Confessions 11, “What then
is time?” (Conf. 11.14), clearly belongs to an inquiry of the first sort. It
emerges from his meditation on the ontological opposition between time
16. St.  Augustine on Music, trans.  R. C.  Taliaferro, in Saint Augustine: The
Immortality of the Soul and Other Works (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of
America Press, 1950).
17. On the reliability of sense perception, see O’Daly, Mind, pp. 95–96.
18. “[I]psa mutabilitas apparet, in qua sentiri et dinumerari possunt tempora,
quia rerum mutationibus fiunt tempora, dum variantur et vertuntur species . . . ”
(Conf. 12.8; Augustine here considers unformed matter and change).
19. Similarly, Rist, Augustine, p. 81, asks: “Granted that there is some connec-
tion between time and physical objects, what is the nature of that connection?”
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and eternity, and is pursued in his discussion of various apparent paradoxes.
The present is said to exist only by virtue of constant movement towards
non-being; and neither past nor future appears to exist at all (Conf. 11.14–
20).20 As Augustine concludes, time must be referred to mind: “[There is] a
present of past things, a present of present things, a present of future things.
For these three things are in the soul, and I do not see them elsewhere” (Conf.
11.20).21
From this point, the inquiry of Confessions 11 becomes increasingly
epistemological. Having dissociated time from the movement of bodies
(Conf. 23–24), Augustine turns inward to ask, “How does the mind know
and measure time?” and, equally important, “What are the spiritual conse-
quences of these processes?” Confessions 11 is thus both an account of the
measurement of time—as O’Daly and others have argued—and a study of
the temporality of the human mind. And as I have suggested, this tempo-
rality is an occasion for grave ambivalence, on the one hand leading to God,
on the other to spiritual distraction and inquietude. In considering Au-
gustine’s inquiries into time, I am concerned first with the consequences of
his creationist ontology for the relations of time and eternity. Then, bring-
ing his early work on sense perception (On Music 6) to bear on his account
of measuring time (Conf. 11), I argue that the psychological and physical
accounts of time are compatible. I further suggest that time is not depen-
dent  on  mind: the temporal successiveness of the world is ensured at
creation and by God’s continuing governance.
I. THE ONTOLOGY OF TIME
Augustine’s ontology of time is noteworthy for its departure from Plotinus.
If in earlier writings he sees time as an “image” or “vestige” of eternity (cp.
Tim. 37d; Enn. 3.7.11), from the Confessions forward, he will stress the radical
contrast between the two.22 This opposition between time and eternity—the
starting point of inquiry in Confessions 11—finds a basis in his reshaping of
20. The ontological discussion of Conf. 11.14–20 has also been read as present-
ing a linguistic issue. Following J. M. E. McTaggart, some commentators argue that
“past,” “present,” and “future” are token-reflexive terms; see, for example, O’Daly,
Mind, p. 155; C. Kirwan, Augustine (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 180.
21. “[S]ed fortasse proprie diceretur: tempora sunt tria, praesens de praeteri-
tis, praesens de praesentibus, praesens de futuris. Sunt enim haec in anima tria
quaedam, et alibi ea non video” (Conf. 11.20).
22. For Plato, the infinite motion of time imitates the abiding being of “the
ever-enduring nature” (Tim. 38b–c). On time as an image of eternity in Augustine,
see De Gen. Lib. Imp. 13.38; De Mus. 6.11.29; O’Daly, Mind, p. 152. As O’Daly
observes, Augustine (unlike Plotinus) does not derive his account of time from
eternity as a paradigma or model, but from observation.
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Neoplatonic ontology.23 First, from the Platonists Augustine adopts the
notion of an ontological hierarchy. In a Plotinian universe, each level of
being is filled, the manifestation of plurality from Unity producing a de-
scending continuum or hierarchy of being:
All things which exist, as long as they remain in being, necessarily
produce from their own essences [ousia], in dependence on their
present power, a surrounding reality . . . [which is] a kind of image of
the archetype from which it was produced.24 (Enn. 5.1.6)
Similarly, Augustine too proposes a hierarchy of being—but one caused
by the creative work of the God Who Is (Ex. 3.14). In insisting upon creation
ex nihilo, he introduces a disjunction between the modes of being of Creator
and creature:
God is being in a supreme degree [summa essentia]—he supremely is
—and therefore he is immutable. He gave being [esse] to the things he
created from nothing, but it was not his own supreme being [summe
esse]. To some he gave being in a higher degree [esse amplius], to others
in a lower [minus], and thus he ordered natures according to their
degree of being.25 (De Civ. 12.2)
Thus, between the absolute being of the Creator and the contingent
being of the creature, is interposed an infinite ontological gap—“un abîme
ontologique insurmontable et une différence absolve.”26 Whereas for Plo-
tinus all spiritual beings belong to the same order as intellect, for Augustine
the continuum of being is interrupted. The eternal and unchangeable na-
23. It is not possible here to do justice to the complexity of Augustine’s
ontology or to his indebtedness to Plotinus. See, for example, Gilson, Christian
Philosophy, pp. 197–224; A. Solignac, “Notes Complémentaires,” Les Confessions, vol.
13 of Oeuvres de Saint Augustin (Paris: Brouwer, 1962), 682–95; and Solignac, “Notes”
14:572–84. See also the important reinterpretation of Emilie Zum Brunn, Saint
Augustine: Being and Nothingness, trans. Ruth Namad (New York: Paragon House,
1988).
24. Trans. Gerson, Plotinus, p. 23, who argues that for Plotinus the creativity of
the One operates instrumentally (A causes B, B is the instrument of A’s causal
activity). This causal series, he writes, does produce “ontological and causal grada-
tion of being” (pp. 23–32, p. 237 n.52).
25. La Cité de Dieu, vol. 35 of Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, ed. B. Dombart and A.
Kalb, p. 154: “Cum enim Deus summa essentia sit, hoc est summe sit, et ideo
immutabilis sit: rebus, quas ex nihilo creavit, esse dedit, sed non summe esse, sicut
est ipse; et aliis dedit esse amplius, aliis minus, atque ita naturas essentiarum
gradibus ordinavit.” Augustine adds that Lat. essentia translates Gk. ousia (De Civ.
12.2). On esse, see Gilson, “Notes,” pp. 205–23.
26. Solignac, “Notes” 14:604. On creation ex nihilo and the consequent
“unique gap” between God and his creatures, see also Rist, Augustine, p. 256. For
Plotinus, in contrast, the human mind and soul are extensions of the hypostases
(O’Daly, Mind, p. 1).
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ture of God exists in a manner “far different” [longe aliter] from beings made
from nothing and thus subject to change (De Gen. 5.16.34; De Civ. 12.1).27 In
such an ontology, eternity and time are irrevocably opposed. Time is not an
inferior modality of being in a continuously descending hierarchy, as for
Plotinus, but itself a creature made from nothing (De Gen. 5.5.12). As Augus-
tine makes clear in Confessions 11.11, the mutability of time (numquam stans)
is in direct opposition to the abiding stability of eternity (semper stans).28
Second, Augustine’s concept of a timeless eternity is clearly indebted
to Plotinus’s account of Intellect, which “abides in the same in itself and
does not change” (Enn. 3.7.3; cp. Conf. 11.13).29 In contrast, Augustine
departs significantly from Plotinus’s account of time, which, originating in
the procession of the hypostases, implies the sort of ontological continuum
he rejects. Plotinus associates time with the mediating activities of Soul,
whose “unquiet power” impelled it to make the sensible world in imitation
of the intelligible world. When Soul “falls” to the world of the senses, it
transfers to successiveness that which Intellect holds in stable simultaneity
and unity. This “fall” produces time, “the life of Soul in a movement of
passage from one way of life to another”—that is, the life of Soul considered
in its successiveness or disparateness (Enn. 3.7.11).30 As Plotinus explains,
because time must exist as an image of eternity, “the spreading out [diasta-
sis] of [intelligible] life [in discursive thought] involves time” (Enn. 3.7.11).
Just as the sense-world is a disintegrated communication of intelligible
being, so time is a dispersed version of eternity. It differs in degree but not
in kind. In contrast, for Augustine time and eternity are opposed and “not
comparable” (incomparabilem; Conf. 11.11). Time is the ontological conse-
quence of creation ex nihilo and the distinguishing feature of finite crea-
tion—“[une] trace de néant originel.”31 Indeed, the opposition between
time and eternity provides the structure for what has been called Au-
gustine’s “metaphysics of conversion.”32 In the act of turning toward that
27. “Quamuis ergo illa aeterna incommutabilisque natura . . . longe scilicet
aliter, quam sunt ista, quae facta sunt . . . ” (De Gen. 5.16.34). On creation ex nihilo
and change, see De Civ. 12.1; on the falling away of sin in things made from nothing,
see De Civ. 14.13; see esp. Gilson, “Notes.”
28. Cp. Augustine’s prayer: “Pater meus aeturnus es; at ego in tempora dissi-
lui . . . ” (Conf. 11.29). That the opposition of time to eternity finds a basis in
Augustine’s ontology does not, of course, imply opposition between Creator and
creature. Augustine holds that “man’s nature was created good by God; but was
made changeable by him who is changeless, since it was created from nothing. And
so the will . . . can turn away from good to do evil” (De Civ. 15.21).
29. Plotinus, Enneads, trans. A. H. Armstrong (1967: Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press, 1980), 3:303–5.
30. Gerson, Plotinus, pp. 121–22. As he notes, “[T]he creation of soul and time
is just their dependence on the One”; the procession of the hypostases is eternal.
31. Gilson, “Notes,” p. 213.
32. Originating with Etienne Gilson, this expression is developed by E. Zum
Brunn, Saint Augustine, pp. 74–94, who views the dilemma of the soul poised
between being and nothingness as inseparable from the metaphysics of creation.
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which immutably is, the temporal creature, recalled by God’s goodness, at
length perceives its own dissimilitude (cp. Conf. 7.10): “C’est le temps qui
permet de sentir cet écart.”33 Time is thus both opposed to eternity and
itself undeniably real—as Richard Sorabji writes, “with its distractions, all
too real.”34
Fundamental to Augustine’s thought is the premise that time cannot
exist without change—the notion of “empty time” would not be admissible
to him.35 As we have seen, this change is of two kinds: “For if there were no
motion of either a spiritual or corporeal creature, by which the future
moving through the present would succeed the past, there would be no
time at all” (De Gen. 5.5.12). According to Augustine’s reading of Genesis in
Confessions 12, there are two created things which, lacking change, do not
participate in time. The angels or spiritual creation (the “heaven” of Gen.
1:1) immediately turn and adhere to God in beatific contemplation, thus
transcending change and time; and unformed matter (“earth”) remains as
it were “below” time, in its undifferentiated formlessness unable to support
change, and so without motion or time.36 In a difficult passage in the City
of God, however,  the  angels—which in the Confessions are described  as
“mutable without mutation” (12.12)—are said to participate in temporality.
Angels have existed always and thus in all time, for without them time would
not exist: “[Y]et their movements, through which times pass [peraguntur],
move from the future into the past; and therefore they cannot be coeternal
with the Creator” (De Civ. 12.16).37 In developing a theory of history in City,
Augustine argues that God has always had a (temporal) creation subject to
his eternal sovereignty (De Civ. 12.l6; cp. De Trin. 5.16.17). His consequent
modification of his teachings—that time began with the movement of the
angels, “before the creation of the sky”—is congruent with his views on
mental motion and time.38
In contrast, formless matter can never sustain change or time. For
33. Guitton, Le temps, p. 138. On conversion in Augustine and Plotinus, see
esp. Guitton, Le temps, pp. 127–45; and Solignac, “Notes” 13:682–95.
34. Sorabji, Time, p. 30
35. On Sydney Shoemaker’s essay, “Time without Change,” Journal of Philosophy
66 (1969): 363–81, see Sorabji, Time, pp. 75–78; see also Don Lodzinsky, “Empty
Time and the Eternality of God,” Religious Studies 31 (1995): 87–95.
36. On unformed matter, see esp. Conf. 12.6–9, 12.11–13, 12.15; 12.19.
Augustine modifies Plotinus’s concept of matter, but does not clarify how that which
lacks form exists. On spiritual creation, see, e.g., Conf. 12.11–13; 12.15; and A. H.
Armstrong, “Spiritual or Intelligible Matter in Plotinus and St. Augustine,” in
Augustinus Magister (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1954), pp. 277–83; Solignac,
“Notes” 14:592–98.
37. “tamen eorum motus, quibus tempora peraguntur, ex futuro in praeteri-
tum transeunt . . . ” (De Civ. 12.16).
38. Augustine’s teachings on angels and time vary with context. Here he
argues that time, supported by angelic motion, exists during the first three days of
creation (ante caelum), but not in measured intervals. The argument is congruent
with De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Impf. 1.3.8, where time begins with angelic motion; but not
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Augustine materia informis is an ontological conundrum, a created thing so
dissimilar to God that it scarcely exists. As he will argue, matter and form
were created simultaneously, coming into being together as do voice and
word, or sound and song (De Gen. 1.15.29; cp. Conf. 12.29). Indeed, accord-
ing to Augustine’s mature teaching, God created all things at once—matter,
form, and the works of the six days—some actually and some potentially, in
a single  atemporal instant. On  the one  hand, Augustine’s doctrine of
creation simul systematically eliminates all temporality from the six days of
the Genesis narrative, thereby safeguarding divine immutability and ensur-
ing a sharp and irrevocable separation between time and eternity. God
made temporal creation all at once, without Himself being subject to time
(De Gen. 4.35.56). On the other hand, with his theory of causal reasons,
Augustine meticulously provides for the subsequent orderly development
of created things in time according to divine will.39 All things unfold tem-
porally according to the intelligible “reasons” implanted incorporeally in
corporeal things at first creation (De Gen. 4.33.51–52). The time of the
created world, both spiritual and material, is therefore associated not simply
with movement and change, but, as Augustine writes, with “[change] ac-
cording to the ordered successiveness of things established by God, who
governs all he created” (De Gen. 5.5.12).40 For time itself “moves according
to the numbers received atemporally at creation” (De Gen. 4.33.52).41
II. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TIME
In Confessions 11, the well-known psychological account of time, Augustine’s
argument turns precisely on the issue of time and physical movement. Im-
plicity engaging earlier views of time—although we do not know precisely
with which discussions he was familiar—Augustine’s analysis of the solar day
demonstrates that time is not the movement of celestial bodies, or any other
with Conf. 12.15, where spiritual creation precedes time; nor with De Gen. ad Litt.
4.29.46, where the angels atemporally apprehend a simultaneous creation. As
Augustine taught creation simul when City 12 was composed (c. 417), the “days” of
Genesis cannot be temporal; rather, I would suggest, he makes a logical division
between the first three and final three days. The passage shows that (1) the two
cities originate, with the angels, at the start of time; (2) time is not dependent on
celestial motion; and (3) spiritual motion alone can support time. Of course, the
nature of angelic time is unknowable; see Sorabji, Time, p. 31–32.
39. On the doctrine of causal reasons, see De Gen. ad Litt. 4.33.51–52, 5.7.20,
6.6.10; and De Trin. 3.9.16.
40. “Cum [tempus] sit creaturae motus ex alio in aliud consequentibus rebus
secundum ordinationem administrantis Dei cuncta quae creavit” (De Gen. ad Litt.
5.5.12).
41. De Gen. 4.33.52: “[H]os enim numeros tempora peragunt, quos cum crear-
entur non temporaliter acceperunt.”
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physical motion.42 As he shows, the interval “day” remains the same whether
the sun moves as usual, speeds up, or is miraculously at rest. First, he argues,
the sun stood still for Joshua; yet the battle was fought during its own suffi-
cient temporal interval (spatium temporis). This scriptural example divorces
time from celestial movement—the relation of temporal unit to solar motion
tells us nothing about time itself—and leads to the view that “time is a kind of
extension” or distensio (Conf. 11.23). Second, he argues, although bodies
move in time, their movement does not constitute time; moreover, the dura-
tion of both movement and rest is measured by time (Conf. 11.24; cp. Enn.
3.7.8). Third—and here, in turning to speech and sound, Augustine leaves
behind examples of movement in space—we can compare long and short
syllables, and so measure poetic feet.43 But since syllables may be pro-
nounced quickly or slowly, the mind does not possess an exact or invariable
time-measure (certa mensura; Conf. 11.26).44 Time thus seems to be a “stretch-
ing out” or extension of the mind itself (Conf. 11.26).
At this point, having abandoned the problem of physical motion, the
inquiry of Confessions 11 becomes clearly epistemological: Augustine will be
concerned with how the mind measures and is affected by time. For time is
preeminently the dimension of the rational soul:
God placed spiritual over corporeal creation, because the soul is moved
or changed only in time, but the body moves in both time and place. .
. . Now, whatever moves through space necessarily moves through time;
but not everything that moves through  time  must also be  moved
through space.45 (De Gen. 8.20.39)
That is, the time of the physical world will always imply space; but the
time of mind or soul exists independently from, and is ontologically superior
to, space and bodily motion. Yet Augustine consistently emphasizes that the
human being is a composite or mixture of two substances, spiritual and
42. O’Daly, Mind, p. 153. Conf. 11 echoes Plotinus’s critique of Aristotle (Enn.
3.7.8–10) but does not address the view that “time is . . . only movement insofar as
it admits of numeration” (Physics 219b2). Callahan, Four Views, p. 159, identifies the
“learned man” of Conf. 11.23 with Plato; but, as Plotinus notes, Plato did not teach
that celestial bodies are time, only that they mark the divisions of time (Enn. 3.7.12).
43. On oral reading as practiced in late antiquity, see Brian Stock, Augustine
the Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 1–35.
44. That is, for Augustine, time is relative; the mind possesses no absolute
time-standard; see McEvoy, “St. Augustine’s Account,” pp. 571–72; O’Daly, Mind,
pp. 159–60.
45. “Spiritalem autem creaturam corporali praeposuit, quod spiritalis tantum-
modo per tempora mutari posset, corporalis autem per tempora et locos. Exempli
enim gratia per tempus mouetur animus uel reminiscendo, quod oblitus erat, uel
discendo, quod nesciebat, uel volendo, quod nolebat; per locos autem corpus. . . .
Omne autem, quod mouetur per locum, non potest nisi et per tempus simul moueri;
at non omne, quod mouetur per tempus, necesse est etiam per locum moueri” (De
Gen. ad Litt. 8.20.39).
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corporeal; as he writes, the soul loves and wishes for body, as people naturally
wish to live (De Gen. 7.27.38).46 In consequence, his psychological account of
time in Confessions 11—while holding in abeyance the problem of time and
material creation—does not ignore the bodily senses or the external world.
Thus Augustine’s central illustration, measuring time in the recitation of
verse, takes its beginning from hearing sound in the sense-world.
The angels of Confessions 12 who transcend time in face-to-face knowl-
edge of God offer an instructive epistemological model: always in the pre-
sent, with no future to expect or memory to convey to the past, they never
experience the distension that characterizes the human mind in time. Au-
gustine’s psychological account of time, in contrast, concerns a rational soul,
united to a body, by means of whose “messengers” it receives information
about the sense-world, to be stored in memory and judged by mind (De Gen.
7.14.20). Significantly, in Confessions 11 we do not find an account of purely
spiritual temporality, the soul “remembering what it had forgotten or . . .
wishing what it did not wish” (De Gen. 8.20.39).47 Instead, Augustine here
describes the mental processes that occur as the four iambs of the verse “Deus
creator omnium” are pronounced, heard, and measured (Conf. 11.27).
Insofar as the senses give accurate information, he observes, the mind
perceives a long syllable to be twice the measure of a short.48 But since any
interval must be completed to be measured—in which case it will have ceased
to exist—we measure not sound but the impression (affectio) of sound pre-
sent to memory (Conf. 11.27). For as Augustine explains in his earlier treatise
On Music, perception depends upon memory: just as a diffusion of light from
the eye connects objects in spatial intervals (magnitude), so memory—“the
light of time-intervals”—connects instants in temporal intervals (duration)
(De Mus. 6.8.21).49 The effectiveness of Augustine’s example—the recitation
46. Asking whether the soul is constrained to enter the body, Augustine writes:
“Sed melius creditur hoc naturaliter uelle, id est in ea natura creari, ut uelit, sicut
naturale nobis est uelle uiuere” (De Gen. ad Litt. 7.27.38); see De Civ. 10.29 (“the
body is united with the soul so that man may be entire and complete”); De Gen.
10.12.20; and Rist, Augustine, pp. 92–100.
47. My account of Augustine’s views on soul draws upon De Gen. ad Litt. 7; see
also Conf. 10. For De Gen. ad Litt. 8.20.39, see n.45, above.
48. “Quantum sensus manifestus est, brevi syllaba longam metior . . . ”; “fidenter-
que respondeo, quantum exercitato sensu fiditur, illam simplam esse . . . (my emph.;
Conf. 11.27). In Contra Acad. 3.11.24–26, Augustine argues that sense knowledge, as
simple appearance, is infallible: the skeptic cannot refute one who says, “I know that
this seems white to me.” For discussion, see Gilson, Christian Philosophy, pp. 40–41;
O’Daly, Mind, pp. 92–105.
49. “Ut igitur nos ad capienda spatia locorum diffusio radiorum juvat . . . ut
ergo eorum effusione adjuvamur ad capienda spatia locorum, ita memoria, quod
lumen est temporalium spatiorum, quantum in suo genere quodammodo extrudi
potest, tantum eorumdem spatiorum capit” (De Mus. 6.8.21, in Dialogues Philoso-
phiques, ed. Guy Finaert and F. J. Thonnard, vol. 7 of Oeuvres de Saint Augustin [Paris:
Brouwer, 1947], p. 404). All citations are to this edition; translations are indebted
to Taliaferro.
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of Ambrose’s hymn—lies in the fact that audible duration, unlike spatial
magnitude, does not persist in the sense-world as an object of perception. As
he remarks elsewhere, “both sound and its hearing . . . cease to be at the same
time” (De Trin. 14.10.13). Clearly, then, the mind itself guarantees the ex-
tendedness or continuum needed for the process of measuring: as Augustine
concludes, “In te, anime meus, tempora mea metior” (“In you, my mind, I
measure times” [Conf. 11.27]). In effect, Augustine has transferred the onto-
logical problem—the non-existence of past and future, the inextendedness
of the present—to the epistemology of time: either the time which he meas-
ures is this present impression (affectionem) fixed in memory, he writes, “or I
do not measure time” (Conf. 11.27).50
It is precisely in referring the existence of time to the measuring mind
that one discovers its negative effects. According to Augustine’s psychologi-
cal account of time, the soul regulates the measuring process by means of
present attention or intentio. This is an activity of will, denoting the motion,
tension, or concentration of soul that makes possible both sensation and
cognition—“le dynamisme actif de l’âme en tant qu’elle ’se tend vers’ les
objets extérieurs ou vers elle-même.”51 As Augustine emphasizes, in meas-
uring time the mind is the active agent: it expects, attends, and remembers
(Conf. 11.28). In the recitation of a psalm, for example, intentio (attentio) or
present attention is directed simultaneously towards the (non-existent)
future in expectation and the (non-existent) past in memory.52 At the start,
expectation “is stretched over” (tenditur) the entire psalm; but as recitation
proceeds, expectation diminishes while memory grows proportionately,
“stretch[ing] over” (tenditur) the verses which have been recited. The pre-
sent moment itself lacks extension (spatium); yet present attention is con-
tinuous (perdurat), conveying future things through itself to become past,
and thus linking expectation and memory (Conf. 11.28). Hence the essen-
tial temporality of the mind, which is stretched (distenditur) in two direc-
tions, future and past; for the incorporeal soul, indivisible in space, is always
50. Similarly, to measure silence, we lengthen (tendimus) our thoughts to an
interval as though a sound had occurred (Conf. 11.27; cp. De Mus. 6.3.4).
51. Agaësse and Solignac, La Genèse, 48:703. In Conf. 11.20, Augustine speaks
of past, present, and future as memoria, contuitus (direct sight), and expectatio; in
describing the measurement of time, he uses the terms intentio and attentio (Conf.
11.28–29). Operative in both perception and cognition, intentio may equally de-
scribe attention to the senses or a mental concentration that causes one to ignore
the physical world (De Gen. 7.19.25; 7.20.26; 12.20.42). On intentio as the volitional
power of animating soul, see De Mus. 6.5.9; as mental concentration ordering ideas
in memory, see Conf. 10.11; as attention of will or mind in perception and recollec-
tion, see De Trin. 11; 15.3.5. See also O’Daly, Mind, pp. 84–85; Solignac, “Notes,”
14:590.
52. Intentio is the mental activity unifying future, present, and past; whereas
attentio may be viewed as permanence of consciousness in perceiving and measuring
time. See Solignac, “Notes,” 14:590; O’Daly, Mind, p. 85.
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divided in time (De Gen. 7.21.27–28).53 The expression distensio animi thus
refers to the time of mind itself—for the soul’s extendedness makes possible
the existence of past and future together in the present—and also, consid-
ered as a spiritual activity, quite literally describes the condition of the soul
in perceiving and measuring time.54
And as we have seen, Augustine deplores this condition: “Behold, my
life is distended . . . and I am torn apart in time” (Conf. 11.29). The concen-
tration of the soul in measuring time is inevitably accompanied by diffusion
and scattering. In attempting to escape what Etienne Gilson has called “the
anguish of time and becoming,” the distended or distracted soul may seek
unity through a second concentration, intentio ad superiora.55 This move-
ment directs the soul not toward future and transitory things—the objects
of temporal expectation—but toward its eternal goal. “Not distractedly but
intently,” Augustine writes, “not according to distentio but intentio,” the soul
guided by the Mediator may briefly transcend time in contemplation of the
eternal (Conf. 11.29; cp. Phil. 3.12–14).56
We have seen that, according to the epistemological inquiry, percep-
tion and cognition themselves create time in the measuring mind; and that
for Augustine these mental operations find their beginning in the external
world and the senses. Is it then the case that the time of mind coexists and
coincides with the time of the physical world? To return to an earlier
question: Is Augustine’s psychological account of time in Confessions 11
compatible with the several accounts of time in the physical world found in
his commentaries on Genesis—accounts which emerge not from empirical
inquiry and introspection, but from the interpretation of revealed truth? As
I noted earlier, these questions are clarified by the final book of On Music,
a study of sense perception—of the relations of mind and world—which
develops a model of hearing analogous to that of temporal measurement.
53. With the notion of distensio, Augustine resolves the initial ontological
paradoxes: past and future exist as memoria and expectatio; a long past is a long
memory of past time, a long future a long expectation of the future; the inextended
present endures as an attentio whose objects continually change.
54. For varying interpretation of the term distensio animi, see Gilson, Augustine,
pp. 194–95, who views it as a “metaphor” for time; Guitton, Le temps, pp. 230–32,
and Solignac, “Notes,” 14:589–91, who consider intentio (distensio) to be activities of
mind; and O’Daly, Mind, pp. 153–54, who writes that distensio animi “cannot be a
definition, but . . . evokes whatever accompanies . . . the cognitive act of measuring
time.”
55. Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York:
Random House, 1954), pp. 592–93 n.23.
56. “[E]t a veteribus diebus colligar sequens unum, praeterita oblitus, non in
ea quae futura et transitura sunt, sed in ea quae ante sunt non distentus, sed extentus,
non secundum distentionem, sed secundum intentionem sequor ad palmam supernae
vocationis, ubi audiam vocem laudis et contempler delectationem tuam nec venien-
tem nec praetereuntem” (Conf. 11.29; my emph.). On intentio ad superiora, see esp.
Guitton, Le temps, p. 237; on Augustine’s changing attitudes toward “Neoplatonic”
vision, see Rist, Augustine, p. 200.
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In On Music 6, as in Confessions 11, the soul is shown to be the active agent,
working by appropriate direction of intentio. In hearing, as in measuring
time, memory is found to be indispensable: “For any syllable, no matter how
short . . . is stretched [tenditur] over some temporal interval” (De Mus.
6.8.21).57 Most importantly, both texts posit similar models of the relations
of exterior, interior, and superior things.
Thus, On Music examines the “number-traces belonging to time-inter-
vals” (vestigiis numerorum ad moras temporum pertinentium) in order to study the
operation of the soul in relation to the sense world, the body it animates,
itself, and God, “passing from corporeal to incorporeal things” (De Mus.
6.2.2). Using the hymn, “Deus creator omnium,” Augustine distinguishes
several classes of “numbers”—a complex term signifying rhythm, harmony,
or proportion—which pertain variously to sound, memory, sense, voice, and
natural judgment.58 The so-called “sounding numbers” (sonantes), the
rhythms and intervals of sound, belong to bodies in the sense world. These,
Augustine makes clear, exist independently of perception: “For you won’t
deny the possibility of a sound’s beating the air by the drop of liquid or the
shock of bodies, with pauses and limits of this sort, and existing where no
hearer is present” (De Mus. 6.2.2; one thinks of a water clock).59 But since
inferior body cannot act upon soul, the rhythms of sound do not cause
sensation. Rather, agency resides with mind: in perceiving, the soul directs its
attention to changes undergone by the body, and, affected by its own opera-
tions, acts upon itself to produce the “heard” or “reacting” numbers of sense
(occursores; De Mus. 6.4.5–6.5.12).60 Immediately imprinted upon memory,
the “remembered” numbers (recordabiles) act as intermediaries, allowing the
mind to grasp the heard numbers of sense; as they accurately replicate the
heard numbers, “remembered” numbers reliably correspond to sounding
numbers in the sense-world (De Mus. 6.2.3). In producing “voiced” or “ad-
57. Without memory, we would not hear at all: “Quamlibet enim brevis syllaba,
cum et incipiat et desinat, alio tempore initium ejus, et alio finis sonat. Tenditur
ergo et ipsa quantulocumque temporis intervallo. . . . In audienda itaque vel
brevissima syllaba, nisi memoria nos adjuvet . . . nihil nos audisse possumus dicere”
(De Mus. 6.8.21). Concepts of time basic to Conf. 11 appear in On Music 6; for
example, all temporal measurement is relative (6.7.19); temporal intervals are
infinitely divisible (6.8.21); rest as well as sound (motion) constitutes a temporal
interval (6.10.26).
58. On numerus, see Finaert and Thonnard, eds., Dialogues, pp. 513–14; on the
important relation of number and form, see O’Daly, Mind, p. 185, and De Lib. Arb.
2.16.
59. “Nam credo non te esse negaturum fieri posse, ut in aliquo loco aliquis
sonus existat hujuscemodi morulis et dimensionibus verberans aerem vel stillicidio
vel aliquo alio pulsu corporum, ubi nullus adsit auditor” (De Mus. 6.2.2; cp. “stillae
temporum,” Conf. 11.2).
60. Of the relation between the senses and the world, Augustine writes: “This
affection [of the ears touched by sound] is . . . the measure of the sound producing
it. . . . Nor can it be except when its author, sound, is present, for it is like a trace
imprinted in water” (De Mus. 6.2.3).
AUGUSTINE’S AMBIVALENCE ABOUT TEMPORALITY 143
vancing” numbers (in the act of reciting; progressores), however, the soul may,
quite independently of the external world, find regular time-intervals in the
rhythms of pulse or respiration made by its own work in the body (De Mus.
6.3.4).61 Finally, all numbers are found pleasing or displeasing according to
“judicial” numbers (judiciales); and are further judged according to other
“hidden” and immutable numbers—for even as it perceives temporal things,
writes Augustine, the soul recognizes in itself superior and unchanging num-
bers given by God (De Mus. 6.10.25; 6.12.34).62
It may be objected that the beats and intervals described in On Music
do not constitute time, but only regular change—and some kind of change,
as Sorabji notes, is presupposed by both the psychological and physical
accounts of time.63 Yet Augustine does not make precise the relation be-
tween time and changing things, whether spiritual or material. Mutable
created things are variously said “to suffer” (patior); “to be subject to”
(subdo); or simply “to have” (habeo) time; conversely, temporal intervals
(tempora) are said to be “passed through” (perago, ago) or “made” (fio) by the
changing motions of material and spiritual creation.64 The closest we can
come to explaining the relations between time and created things is to say
that time is supported or conditioned, but not produced, by the motion and
change of creation. Time does not exist without changing things, whether
spiritual or corporeal; yet time is itself a creature: God made together both
time and “those things through whose motion time runs” (De Gen. 5.5.12;
De Civ. 12.26).65 But if Augustine does not fully develop his account, as some
commentators have argued, his epistemological focus is clear: he wishes “to
understand the nature and power of the time by which we measure,” and
which itself is measured (Conf. 11.23).66
61. For accounts of the mental operations that prepare the time-intervals of
future speech, see also Conf. 11.27 and De Trin. 15.7.13.
62. The perceptual model of On Music closely resembles the account of vision
in De Trin. 11.9.16, where the species (form) of the body gives rise to the forms of
sense, memory, and thought.
63. Sorabji, Time, p. 31 n.53.
64. See, for example, “nullam patitur vicissitudinem temporum” (of the angel;
Conf. 12.11); “quo tempori subderetur, non haberet” (of formless matter; Conf. 12.12);
“vices temporum habere non posse” (of formless matter; Conf. 12.19); “rerum muta-
tionibus fiunt tempora” (Conf. 12.8); “Ubi enim nulla creatura est, cuius mutabilibus
motibus tempora peragantur, tempora omnino esse no possunt . . . tamen eorum
motus, quibus tempora peraguntur, ex futuro in praeteritum transeunt” (of angels; De
Civ. 12.16); “in eis agantur vicissitudines temporum” (of formed matter; Conf. 12.12).
65. Cp. Rist, Augustine, pp. 81–83, who argues that “time is not a mere epiphe-
nomenon of the physical world.” As I suggest, Augustine refers time directly to
divine governance: “Quis enim alius creator est temporum, nisi qui fecit ea, quorum
motibus currerent tempora?” (De Civ. 12.26).
66. See, for example, Lacey, “Empiricism,” 283, who argues that Augustine
“lacked sufficient linguistic equipment to develop [his objectivist argument].” “Ego
scire cupio vim naturamque temporis, quo metimur corporum motus . . . ” (Conf.
11.23).
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As a description of sensing sound, and, by extension, of measuring
duration, then, On Music suggests the following about the relations of mind,
body, world, and time: (1) time, insofar as it may be considered as intervals
marked by natural rhythms—for example, the “sounding numbers” of fall-
ing drops of water—exists in, or is a feature of, the sense world inde-
pendently of mind; (2) the bodily affections to which the soul attends
reliably represent the duration of stimuli in the sense world, as do the
“reacting” numbers of sense produced by the soul (nor can these affections
and numbers exist without the stimuli); (3) the time of the sense world does
not have a causal effect upon soul, which perceives in memory reliable
impressions effected by itself (“remembered” numbers);67 (4) except in
cases of purely mental movement, time may be said to be perceived by the
person, a mixture or composite of body and soul;68 (5) “numbers” make
mutability or changes of form perceptible and intelligible as time; (6) the
measuring soul is the middle term in a characteristic Augustinian hierarchy
moving from exterior to interior, and interior to superior—from sounding
to rational to immutable numbers.
* * *
A contemporary writer, M. F. Burnyeat, observes:
Nowadays, if a philosopher finds he cannot answer the philosophical
question, “What is time?” or “Is time real?” he applies for a research
grant to work on the problem during the next year’s sabbatical. He
does not suppose that the arrival of next year is actually in doubt.69
I do not believe that Augustine had a need to “insulate” his ordinary
judgments about the time of the world from the conclusions of his psycho-
logical analysis of time in this manner.70 As I have suggested in reading On
Music, his two accounts of time are both compatible and complementary:
the measurement of time “stretches” the soul temporally in a manner
67. According to Conf. 11.27, to measure time is to measure the impression
passing things make on the mind (affectionem, quam res praetereuntes in [animo]
faciunt); as On Music makes clear, however, the soul itself effects the remembered
numbers whose counterparts (res) exist in the world.
68. That is, the soul can perceive its own temporarily (e.g., in motions of
remembering, forgetting, knowing, wishing) through self-observation alone.
69. M. F. Burnyeat, “The Sceptic in His Place and Time,” in Philosophy in
History, ed. R. Rorty et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp.
225–54; cited by Gareth B. Matthews, Thought’s Ego in Augustine and Descartes (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 175.
70. For the notion of “insulation,” see Matthews, Thought’s Ego, pp. 175–87,
who argues that Augustine increasingly protected himself from the threat of philo-
sophical skepticism with “a total confidence in divine revelation.”
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proportionate to the perceived time-interval in the world. Thus, the psycho-
logical and physical accounts of time may be viewed as complementary
aspects of cosmological order, the one describing spiritual, the other corpo-
real motion. As Augustine makes clear, however, the time of mind may also
exist independently of the material world, as in the case of purely mental
motion (e.g., in learning; De Gen. 8.20.39). It remains to be asked, con-
versely, whether the time of the material world may exist without mind, or
whether it is the case that “before there was a human consciousness . . . ‘be-
fore’ and ‘after’ had no meaning”?71
In a well-known passage, Aristotle asks whether time (“the number of
motion in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’”) may exist without soul. He
responds in the negative, for number cannot exist without someone to
count, and only soul can count. He adds, however, that “if movement [of
which time is an attribute] can exist without soul, and the before and after
are attributes of movement, [then] time is these qua numerable” (Physics
219b1–5; 223a21–29).72 As has been seen, Augustine conceives the problem
quite differently. According to his commentaries on Genesis, the time of
both physical and spiritual creation is guaranteed by God, who establishes
the ordered successiveness of things—an inherent “before” and “after”
independent of any observer—at first creation (De Gen. ad Litt. 5.5.12). In
particular for Augustine, number is a trace of that Wisdom which confers
form upon created things (De Gen. 4.3.7; cp. Wisd. 11.21).73 Temporal
“numbers” (to take a single instance) are “in” the world by virtue of eternal
numbers, so that a tree grows, flowers, and bears fruit in “fixed time-meas-
ures” (certis dimensionibus temporum; De Mus. 6.17.57).
As Augustine later argues in his mature interpretation of Genesis, the
temporal movement of creatures through time, fulfilling the proper func-
tion of each, is owing to the causal reasons whose “laws of numbers” are
atemporally given at first creation (De Gen. 4.33.51–52).74 If, as John Rist has
claimed, for Augustine time is not mind-dependent but is “a kind of prop-
erty  of  things, or  better a formal concept  or category of  the physical
universe,” this “category” is ultimately attested to by the revelation of Scrip-
ture.75 According to Augustine’s interpretation, Genesis reveals that tempo-
ral successiveness is   ensured at creation   and by God’s   continued
71. Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 195.
72. In The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random
House, 1941), pp. 292, 299. For Aristotle on time and consciousness, see Sorabji,
Time, pp. 90–97.
73. See Agaësse and Solignac, “Mesure, nombre et poids,” in “Notes Complé-
mentaires,” 48:635–39. The example from On Music which follows represents an
early formulation of Augustine’s theory of causal reasons.
74. De Gen. ad Litt. 4.33.51–52: “[Q]uod nunc uidemus temporalibus interuallis
ea moueri ad peragenda, quae suo cuique generi conpetunt, ex illis rationibus insitis
ueniat, quas tamquam seminaliter sparsit Deus in ictu condendi. . . . Hos enim nu-
meros tempora peragunt, quos cum crearentur non temporaliter acceperunt.”
75. Rist, Augustine, p. 83.
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governance: “He rested in order to create subsequently, by administering
these things, the order of time and temporal things” (De Gen. 7.28.42).76 But
beyond this, the most that can be said of the time of the physical world is
that it seems to be so.77 In contrast, the mind is always intimately aware of
its own temporality, whether in measuring time, seeking to know itself, or
struggling to arrive at truth (De Lib. Arb. 2.6.55—57). Whereas God knows
all things unchangeably, created beings know things successively in a man-
ner that “distends” and makes ever more temporal the rational soul (Conf.
11.31). The problem is finally moral: the soul must freely choose how best
to direct its intentio, for the mind is more dispersed by the fluctuating data
of sense than by stable intelligibles.
In an important essay, H.-I. Marrou has argued that Augustine’s ambi-
valence about time—on the one hand, the vehicle of redemption; on the
other, of degradation and death—is the effect of original sin. “C’est l’exist-
ence du péché . . . qui donne au temps de l’homme son caractère sinistre,”
he writes.78 This distinction between the time of nature and that of grace is
basic to Augustine’s view of history. As I have suggested, however, Augustine’s
ambivalence about time arises from still more primary ontological and epis-
temological considerations. From first creation, time proclaims the simulta-
neous being and non-being of things made from nothing (Conf. 11.4); from
the first, the perceiving soul is by nature both concentrated and fragmented
in time, experiences both intentio and distensio (Conf. 11.28–29).79 Thus, each
of Augustine’s two accounts of time—in the world and in the mind—is
separately shaped by a fundamental ambivalence about temporality. But as
the two accounts differ in subject and method, this tension is variously ex-
pressed. The account of time in the physical world—emerging as it does from
the interpretation of the revealed truth of Genesis—treats time as an aspect
of divinely-ordained cosmic order.80 Here, Augustine’s ambivalence is ex-
76. De Gen. ad Litt. 7.28.42: “[S]icut non solum praesentia, uerum etiam futura
fecit omnipotens et ab eis factis requieuit, ut eorum deinceps administratione atque
regimine crearet etiam ordines temporum et temporalium.”
77. See Contra Acad. 3.11.24. As O’Daly, Mind, p. 93, notes, errors occur from
wrong judgment; sense-data simply “appear to be.” Rist, considering the conse-
quences of Augustine’s view that the past does not exist, finds a “self-generated
problem of scepticism” about the continuing knowledge of sensible particulars; see
Rist, Augustine, pp. 45–48, 73–75.
78. Marrou, L’ Ambivalence, pp. 62–75, passim.
79. On the prelapsarian soul and body, see Rist, Augustine, p. 112.
80. It may be noted that, in considering “the meaning of all sorts of statements
whose truth is thought to be beyond doubt” (Matthews, Thought’s Ego, p. 178), Augus-
tine does not seek certitude regarding the physical world—“[i]n this work are more
questions raised than answers found,” he writes of his great commentary on Genesis
(Retractations, cited in Taylor, The Literal Meaning, 1:4). Both the scientific approach
and aporetic character of On Genesis work against genuine ambivalence (a strongly-
held belief that something is simultaneously good and bad). On Augustine and
ancient science, see John J. O’Meara, Understanding Augustine (Dublin: Four Courts
Press, 1997), pp. 110–18.
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pressed only indirectly—for example, in the development of the doctrine of
creation simul, where anxiety about temporality shapes a complicated effort
to distinguish irrevocably between time and eternity. In contrast, as has been
seen, the psychological account of Confessions 11 is an empirical analysis of
the measuring mind, an exploration of self marked by great spiritual an-
guish: “You, lord and father, are in eternity; but I am torn apart in time . . . ”
(Conf. 11.29). Here ambivalence expresses itself directly and affectively, in
Augustine’s simultaneous longing to rise above time and his acknow-
ledgment of—indeed fascination with—the temporality of the human mind.
Augustine’s first contribution to early discussions of time is surely his
analysis of temporal measurement in the mind. Yet equally important is his
treatment of the time of the physical world, which he views as both inde-
pendently existent and congruent with the time of the mind. Augustine’s
many  discussions of the time  of the  created world,  both spiritual and
corporeal, moreover, urge reconsideration of the view that his sole focus
was liberation from time.81 For Augustine, the ontological opposition be-
tween time and eternity expresses itself as a constant tension between
intentio and expectatio, the motions of the soul toward unity or fragmenta-
tion. Yet the cosmological time of God’s creation and continuing govern-
ance provides a foundation for the redemptive time in which Augustine
prays to be “gathered up” or integrated (colligar; Conf. 11.29). For if the
Mediator “has been made a road in time” (De Trin. 7.3.4–5), the distended
soul intends in time to God: “secundum intentionem sequor” (Conf. 11.29).
In such a model, where time mediates between that which is and that which
is not—where intentio provides a corrective context for extentio—ambiva-
lence is unresolved yet ultimately productive. For it is precisely in perceiving
its own temporality and dissimilitude that the soul turns and redirects itself
to God.82 Augustine’s ambivalence about time gives time lasting value.
81. See, for example Gilson, “Notes”; and Teske, “‘Vocans Temporales, Faciens
Aeternos’.”
82. See Conf. 7.10–16. As Solignac notes (“Notes” 13:691), the “region of
dissimilitude” from which the soul turns to God may signify both ontological
unlikeness (mutability and temporality) and spiritual dissimilitude (sin).
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